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Segovia v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 112 (Dec. 28, 2017)1 
 
TORTS: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that (1) the 2015 amendment that added “physician assistant” to 
NRS 41A was not intended to clarify the previous statute’s original intent; and (2) The 2015 
Legislature intended for the 2015 amendment that added “physician assistant” to NRS Chapter 
41A to apply prospectively. 
 
Background 
 
In February 2012, Dr. George Michael Elkanich diagnosed Mary Haase, the mother of real 
party in interest Madden Duda, with bilateral lower extremity radiculopathy. Dr. Elkanich 
recommended surgery and selected physician assistant Jocelyn Segovia to assist in the surgery. 
During the surgery on March 5, 2012, Dr. Elkanich and/or Segovia allegedly tore, sliced, or 
punctured Haase’s aorta which caused her to die mid-surgery. The coroner’s report provided that 
she died from the blood loss that occurred from the laceration to her heart.  
Duda filed a medical malpractice claim and moved for summary judgment as to Jocelyn 
Segovia. The motion argued that Segovia was not entitled to NRS 41A’s abrogation of joint and 
several liability or the $350,000 damages cap because she, as a physician assistant, was not 
considered a “[p]rovider of healthcare” per NRS 41A.017. The district court granted the motion 
for summary judgment because NRS 41A.017 did not extend to physician assistants at the time of 
the decedent’s death and the subsequent 2015 amendment that added “physician assistant” only 
applies prospectively.  
 
Discussion 
 
Writ relief 
 
 Here, Segovia sought relief through a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, a writ of 
mandamus. Segovia argued that the Court should resolve the writ petition to encourage judicial 
economy since many defendants in the underlying lawsuit already settled. Further, Segovia 
provides that she would be able to make informed settlement decisions if she knew whether or not 
she was entitled to the damages cap provided in NRS Chapter 41A.  
 The Court considered the purposes of a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus and its 
discretion to consider petitions that seek extreme remedies despite an available legal remedy.2 
Accordingly, the Court considered the writ as a writ for mandamus since Segovia urged the district 
court to retroactively apply the amended version of NRS Chapter 41A, and because the Court had 
conflicting statements in a published opinion and an unpublished order concerning that issue.  
  
                                                        
1  By Alexis Wendl. 
2  Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 907–08 (2008); Cheung v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005); Barngrover v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 115 Nev. 104, 
111, 979 P.2d 216, 220 (1999). 
 2 
The 2015 amendment to NRS 41A.017 does not apply retroactively 
 
 Following the “Keep our Doctors in Nevada” initiative, the 2015 Legislature specifically 
amended NRS Chapter 41A to limit health care provider liability by preventing the amount of 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits from exceeding $350,000 “regardless of the 
number of plaintiffs, defendants or theories upon which liability [is] based.”3 Additionally, the 
2015 amendment abrogated joint and several liability, meaning health care providers are severally 
liable only for the portion of the judgment that represents a specific defendant’s attributable 
percentage of negligence.4  
Notably, at the time of the 2012 surgery, NRS 41A.017 did not include “physician 
assistant” in the relevant definition for “[p]rovider of health care.” It was not until the 2015 
amendment, after the decedent’s surgery, that “physician assistant” was added to NRS 41A.017. 
Thus, the Court considered whether the 2015 Legislature intended to clarify the original intent of 
the previous version of the statute, or if the 2015 Legislature intended for the amendment to apply 
only prospectively.  
Here, Segovia referenced John Cotton’s testimony before the Senate Committee to 
demonstrate that the 2015 amendment reestablished and clarified the intent of the original statute.5 
Further, the Court previously ruled in the unpublished Zhang v. Barnes opinion that the 2015 
amendment to NRS 41A.017 clarified, rather than changed, the law.6 However, the Zhang decision 
involved another NRS chapter that must be read in harmony with NRS 41A.017. Accordingly, the 
Zhang decision did not state that each 2015 amendment clarified the original intent and should 
apply retroactively. Moreover, in Humboldt General Hospital v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the 
Court declined to retroactively apply another 2015 amendment to NRS 41A.017 that required 
medical malpractice actions be accompanied by a medical expert affidavit.7 
The Court determined that the pre-amendment version of NRS 41A.017 was not ambiguous 
on its face since it specifically defined “provider of health care.” Further, the legislative history, 
although contradictory, does not rebut the strong presumption against retroactivity since the 
Legislature did not explicitly permit retroactivity. NRS 41A.017 specifically states that the 2015 
amendment applies prospectively.8 Moreover, there is a strong presumption that amendments to 
statutes are to be applied prospectively.9  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus, the Court denied Segovia’s writ petition since the 2015 amendments to NRS 41A.017 
do not apply retroactively. Segovia failed to rebut the strong presumption of prospective 
application, and the senate bill specifically stated that the 2015 amendments applied 
prospectively.10 
                                                        
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2017). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045 (2017). 
5  See Hearing on S.B. 292 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 78th Leg. (Nev., March 26, 2015) (testimony of 
John Cotton, KODIN). 
6  Zhang v. Barnes, Docket No. 67219 (Order Affirming in Part, Revising in Part, and Remanding, Sept. 12, 2016). 
7  132 Nev. Adv. Op. 53, 376 P.3d 167 (2016). 
8  2015 Nev. State. Ch. 439, § 11, at 2529 (“The amendatory provisions of this act apply to a cause of action that 
accrues on or after the effective date of this act.”). 
9  Badger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 39, 373 P.3d 89, 94 n.1 (2016). 
10  2015 Nev. State., ch. 439, § 11 at 2529; S.B. 292, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015). 
